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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Restraint of Trade-Fair Trade Acts-Constitutionality
Fair Trade Acts' authorize resale price maintenance-a form of
price fixing. These Acts intitially were received favorably by most
courts2 but recently some have encountered judicial snags.
In 1937, Congress, in passing the Miller-Tydings Amendment8 to
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act' sanctioned resale price maintenance
agreements in the "fair trade" states in transactions involving interstate
commerce. In 1951 the United States Supreme Court in Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.5 dealt "fair trade" a severe blow by
holding that the Miller-Tydings Amendment did not authorize the
enforcement of fair trade agreements against non-signers in interstate
transactions. 6 In addition the Court held that this Act authorized only
minimum prices and did not sanction absolute prices. 7  This decision,
coupled with Sunbeam v. Wentlings which concluded that out of state
mail order sales when made by a non-signing Pennsylvania retailer were
not subject to the Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act, drained the Acts of
most of their vitality.
9
In 1952 Congress passed the McGuire Act 0 which expressly over-
ruled the Schwegnann and Wentling decisions by validating the non-
signers clause, authorizing both minimum and absolute prices, and de-
claring regulation of out of state retail sales was not an undue burden
on commerce.
' Between 1931 and 1941 Fair Trade Acts were passed in 45 states. These
Acts uniformly purported to validate agreements between manufacturers and
wholesalers or retailers whereby the manufacturer protected his trade mark,
brand or name by stipulating the price at which the retailer was to sell the
article. 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 7056 (1953). The North Carolina statute
is N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-50 through 66-57 (1943, recompiled 1950) ; 15 N. C. L.
R-v. 367 (1937).
'Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagrams-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183
(1936); Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss Co., 200 La. 959, 9 So. 2d 303 (1942); Ely
Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N: C. 163, 4 S. E. 2d 428 (1939).
15 U. S. C. § 1 (1946).
'Ibid.
341 U. S. 384, 388 (1951). The majority opinion in this case states, "The
omission of the non-signers provision from the federal law (Miller-Tydings) is
fatal to respondent's position unless we are to perform a distinct legislative func-
tion by reading into the Act a provision that was meticulously omitted from it."
Three justices dissented.
'A typical non-signers clause is: "Willfully and knowingly advertising . . .
or selling any commodity at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered
into pursuant to this article, whether the person so . . . selling is or is not a
party to such a contract is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any
person damaged thereby." N. C. GEN. STAT. § 66-56 (1943, recompiled 1950).
(Italics added).
In the 45 states that passed Fair Trade Acts minimum prices were authorized
in thirty states while fifteen authorized absolute prices. 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
7001 (1953).
8 341 U. S. 944 (1951).
'H. R. RaP. No. 1437, 82d Cong.. 2d Sess. (1952).
" 15 U. S. C. A. § 45 (Supp. 1953).
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Although several state courts, including North Carolina," had up-
held the constitutionality of their Fair Trade Acts, the Florida Supreme
Court refused to follow the well established pattern. Instead, in 1949 it
declared the Florida Act violative of the state constitution in that it
was an excessive exercise of the police power.1 2 However a subsequent
re-enactment intended to remedy the constitutional objection has yet
to be passed on by the Florida Court.13 Subsequently, Michigan, in a
decision rendered after the Schwegmann case and prior to the McGuire
Act, announced that the Michigan Fair Trade Act was violative of the
due process clause of the state constitution and further that the authori-
zation of resale price maintenance agreements exceeded the police
power of the state.
14 
.
More recently, the Supreme Court of Georgia has joined the dis-
senting group. In Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Oneida, Limited,'5
a case in which the defendant was a non-signing retailer who sold the
plaintiff-manufacturer's silverware at a price less than that expressed in
contracts between the plaintiff and other retailers, the Georgia Supreme
Court declared that the Georgia Fair Trade Act 0 contravened both the
due process clause of the state constitution 7 and the supremacy clause
of the Federal Constitution.' 8 On the federal issue the Court utilized
a novel twist in "fair trade" litigation by reasoning that when the
Georgia Act was passed in 193710 it violated the Sherman Act as it then
stood2 0 and the subsequent enactment of the Miller-Tydings and
McGuire Acts did not operate to validate the Georgia Act inasmuch
as it was void ab initio.
" Pyroil Sales Co. v. The Pep Boys, 5 Cal. 2d 446, 55 P. 2d 194 (1936)
Burroughs Welcome & Co. v. Johnson Wholesale Perfume Co., 128 Conn. 596,
24 A. 2d 841 (1942); Seagrams-Distillers Corp. v. Old Dearborn Distributing
Co., 363 Ill. 610, 2 N. E. 2d 940 (1936); International Cellucotton Products v.
Kraus Co., 200 La. 959, 9 So. 2d 303 (1942); Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson &
Co., 176 Md. 682, 7 A. 2d 176 (1939); Johnson & Johnson v. Weissbard
Brothers, 121 N. J. Eq. 585, 191 Atl. 873 (1937) ; Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Dorf-
man, 273 N. Y. 167, 7 N. E. 2d 30 (1937) ; Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N. C.
163, 4 S. E. 2d 228 (1939); Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Owl Drug Co., 67 S. D.
523, 295 N. W. 292 (1940) ; Sears v. Western Thrift Stores of Olympia, Inc., 10
Wash. 2d 372, 116 P. 2d 756 (1941) ; Weco Products Co. v. Reed Drug Co., 225
Wis. 474, 274 N. W. 426 (1937) (except a provision exempting non-profit
cooperatives).
2 Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp, 40 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949)
28 N. C. L. Rzv. 336 (1950).
'3 Seagram Distillers Corp. v. Ben Greene, Inc., 54 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1951).
,Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109,
54 N. W. 2d 268 (1952).
" 75 S. E. 2d 161 (Ga. 1953).
" GA. CODE ANN. §§ 106-401 through 106-408 (1937).
GA. CoxsT., Art. I, Sect. 1, f II. " U. S. CONsT. Art. VI, cl. 2.
Georgia participated in the legislative "avalanche" that saw 28 states pass
Fair Trade Acts in 1937. 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 17056 (1953).
20 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1946). ". . . every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy




In reaching this conclusion the Supreme Court of Georgia ignored
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Old Dearborn
Distributing Co. v. Seagrams-Distillers Corp.P which specifically upheld
the right of Illinois to authorize resale price maintenance agreements in
intrastate commerce. At the time of the Old Dearborn decision the
law was well established that such practices in interstate commerce
were illegal22 and the twenty-eight states, including Georgia, which
passed Fair Trade Acts in the year after the Old Dearborn case could
have intended to validate only such agreements as involved intrastate
transactions. For this reason the application of the void ab initio
doctrine in this situation seems questionable.
The courts of twenty-nine states have yet to pass on the constitu-
tionality of their Fair Trade Acts. 23  Of the twenty-nine all but four
were passed prior to the Miller-Tydings Amendment, and all twenty-
nine were enacted prior to the McGuire Act. If the reasoning of the
Georgia Court on the federal issue should be followed by these states
the Acts passed prior to Miller-Tydings are totally void. The other
four would become practically impotent for without the benefit of the
McGuire Act the non-signers clauses-the heart of the Acts-would be
inapplicable in interstate commerce. However, it is unlikely that
these twenty-nine states will follow the reasoning of the Georgia Su-
preme Court and thereby declare their Acts void ab initio in whole or in
part.
The alternate ground on which the Georgia opinion is based is less
controversial. In holding that the Georgia Fair Trade Act violated the
Georgia Constitution the Supreme Court of Georgia employed the same
technique as had previously been applied by the highest courts of
Florida and Michigan. Opponents of "fair trade," encouraged by these
decisions may seek expeditious consideration of the Fair Trade Acts in
those states yet to pass on the question. There is little, if any, indica-
tion that states which previously have upheld the constitutionality of
their Acts are ready to take a contrary view. Recently, the Supreme
Court of New York24 and a Federal District Court in Louisiana2 5
reiterated that the Acts of those states were constitutional. In addition
the highest courts of New Jersey2 and California2 7 have restated the
validity of the non-signers clauses in the Acts of those states.
The McGuire Act also has been under attack in both state and
21299 U. S. 183 (1936).
"Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.. 220 U. S. 373 (1911).
2 CCH TRADa REG. REP. 118004 through 8964 (1953).
24 General Electric Co. v. Klein on the Square, Inc., TRADR REG. REP. CUR-
RENT DEcisioNs, 67,443 (1953).
" Ely Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros., 109 F. Supp. 269 (1953)."Johnson & Johnson v. Charmley Drug Co., 95 Atl. 2d 391 (N. J. 1953).
27 The Cal-Dak Co. v. Say-On Drugs, Inc., 254 Pac. 2d 497 (Calif. 1953).
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federal courts. Schwegmann Brothers, Louisiana retailers and long
time foe of "fair trade," challenged this Act on grounds that it violates
the due process clause of the Federal Constitution and constitutes an
unlawful delegation of legislative power to private individuals. The
Louisiana Federal District Court in Ely Lilly Co. v. Schwegmann
Bros.25 upheld the constitutionality of the Act. In General Electric v.
Klein on the Square29 the New York Supreme Court declared the
McGuire Act constitutional as not being in contravention of the due
process or equal protection clauses and not an unlawful delegation of
legislative power. Ultimately the United States Supreme Court may
rule on the constitutionality of the McGuire Act and its sanction of the
controversial non-signers clause. 30 Since the Supreme Court of the
United States has already held that the Fair Trade Acts do not con-
travene the Fourteenth Admendment in intrastate commerce"' it is quite
unlikely that it will now hold the McGuire Act as applied to interstate
transactions is violative of the Fifth Amendment.
Although most states will leave the economic wisdom of Fair Trade
Acts to the Legislature and hence those declaring such Acts to be un-
constitutional will remain in the minority, it is evident that the courts
will give more careful scrutiny to this legislation in the future than has
been true in the past.
JoHN RALPH CAMBRON
Unfair Competition-Export Trade Act-Unfair Methods of
Competition under Section Four
The Sherman Act of 1890 prohibited concerted action by inde-
pendent exporters including the formation of trade associations for
the purpose of eliminating competition among themselves in foreign
trade.' The importance of allowing American exporters to combine
into such an association was stressed in a report submitted to Congress
by the Federal Trade Commission in 1916.2 Spurred by this report,
2'TRADE REG. REP., CURRENT COURT DECISIONS, ff 67,443 (1953).
D 109 F. Supp. 269 (1953).
" The Supreme Court of the United States has never passed directly on the
constitutionality of the Miller-Tydings Act.
" Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagrams-Distillers, Corp., 299 U. S. 183
(1936).
' The Sherman Act prohibits: "Every contract, combination . . . or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade.... ." 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended by 50 STAT.
693 (1937), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-7 (1946).
'Public hearings were conducted in 16 cities; several thousand questionnaires
were sent out to interested individuals and firms; American consuls and com-
mercial attaches sent in reports; a study of the ramifications of foreign cartel
arrangements was made. On June 30, 1916, this report on Cooperation in Amer-
can Export Trade was submitted to Congress. This report may be found in
EXPORT PRIcEs AND EXPORT CARTELS (WEBB-PoMERENE ASSOCIATIONS) 113-118
(TNEC Monograph 6, 1941). See also Love, The Export Trade Act, 8 Go.
WAsHr. L. REv. 608 (1940).
[Vol. 31
